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We present a family of loss-tolerant quantum strong coin flipping protocols; each
protocol differing in the number of qubits employed. For a single qubit we obtain a
bias of 0.4, reproducing the result of Berlín et al . [Phys. Rev. A 80, 062321 (2009)], while
for two qubits we obtain a bias of 0.3975. Numerical evidence based on semi-definite
programming indicates that the bias continues to decrease as the number of qubits is
increased but at a rapidly decreasing rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Coin flipping (CF) is a cryptographic task in which a pair of remote distrustful parties, usually referred to as Alice
and Bob, must agree on a random bit. The problem was first introduced in 1981 by Blum [1], who studied it in
classical settings. There are two variants of the problem: ‘strong’ CF (SCF) and ‘weak’ CF (WCF). In SCF each
party is not aware of the other’s preference for the coin’s outcome. In contrast, in WCF the parties have opposite
and known preferences. Hence, in WCF there is always a winner and a loser, unless one of the parties is caught
cheating, in which case the protocol is aborted. Let Pxy denote the probability that the Alice (Bob) obtains the
outcome x (y) and let P⊥ denote the probability that the protocols is aborted. If both parties are honest then
P00 = P11 = 1/2 and P10 = P01 = P⊥ = 0, i.e. the parties always agree on the outcome of the coin. The security of a
CF protocol is quantified by the extent to which dishonest parties can bias the outcome. We denote by P∗i=ˆ1/2+ ǫ∗i
(Pi∗=ˆ1/2 + ǫi∗) the maximal probability of Alice (Bob) to bias the outcome to i. In SCF the bias is defined as
ǫ=ˆmax {ǫ∗0, ǫ∗1, ǫ0∗, ǫ1∗}, while in WCF the maximum is taken over only two of the biases: If, for example, Alice
prefers the outcome 0, then the bias equals max {ǫ∗0, ǫ1∗}. A protocol is said to be fair whenever both parties enjoy
the same bias.
In classical settings, given unlimited computational power, a dishonest party can always bias the outcome as it
desires [2]. In contrast, this is not the case in quantum settings. Aharonov et al. formulated the first (non-trivial)
quantum SCF protocol in 2000 [3]. This protocol, which achieves a bias of 0.354 [4], began the quest for a SCF
protocol with a vanishing bias. First, Spekkens and Rudolph devised a protocol with a bias of 0.309 [4]. Ambainis
[5] and independently Spekkens and Rudolph [6] soon afterwards introduced protocols pushing the bias to as low as
1/4. However, the prospects of further progress were soon shadowed by two key results. Ambainis proved that any
protocol with a bias of ǫ, whether strong or weak, must consist of at least Ω(log log ǫ−1) rounds of communication
[5], while Kitaev proved that the bias of any quantum SCF protocol is bounded by
(√
2− 1) /2 ≃ 0.207 [7]. Until
recently, it was not known whether this bound can be saturated or whether the bias of 1/4 is optimal. This point has
now been settled by Chailloux and Kerenidis who have presented a protocol that saturates Kitaev’s bound [8], based
on Mochon’s work proving the possibility of quantum WCF with arbitrarily small bias [9].
Quantum WCF was first analyzed by Spekkens and Rudolph in 2001, who introduced a family of protocols that
achieves a bias of
(√
2− 1) /2 [10]. (Previously Goldenberg et al. analyzed the problem of quantum gambling
[11], which is a closely related cryptographic task.) This result was subsequently improved upon by Mochon who
considered WCF protocols with an infinite number of rounds [12, 13], eventually culminating in the aforementioned
result [9]. In addition, quantum SCF and WCF have also been studied in the multi-party [14] multi-outcome scenario
[15, 16] and most recently in both [17, 18].
Even though from a purely theoretical viewpoint a lot of progress has been made in our understanding of quantum
CF, most quantum CF protocols are impractical due to the non-ideal conditions prevalent in any real-life implemen-
tation. These include uncertainties in the preparation and measurement of states, whether inherent or due to noise,
as well as noise and losses in the quantum channels and the quantum memory storage. In the sending of quantum
information over long distances the most common source of malfunctions is losses. The problem with losses is that
they introduce a finite probability for an indefinite outcome – actually no outcome at all – even when both parties are
honest, so that there is always a non-vanishing chance for the protocol to be aborted (i.e. P⊥ = 1 − P00 − P11 > 0).
As pointed out in [15], one way to avoid this situation, is to restart the protocol each time an indefinite outcome
occurs, but this in turn affords a dishonest party very simple cheating strategies, which may even go so far as to
enable it to bias the outcome to its choosing. Remarkably, Berlín et al. have recently devised a ‘loss-tolerant’ SCF
protocol [19, 20] (see also [21]). That is, a protocol whose bias remains unchanged even if we allow for the protocol
to be restarted. However, the loss-tolerance came at a price: the protocol achieves a comparatively high bias of 0.4.
2Figure 1: Alice’s preparation. Each qubit that Alice prepares is polarized along one of the four axes ±nˆ and ±mˆ.
It may well be that there is always a price to be paid. Specifically, it could be that loss-tolerant SCF cannot saturate
Kitaev’s bound. Indeed, at the end of their paper Berlín et al. raise the question of whether it is possible to devise a
loss-tolerant protocol with a lower bias than theirs.
In this paper we answer this question in the affirmative by introducing a family of loss-tolerant SCF protocols,
which outperforms Berlín et al.’s protocol. Each member in the family differs in the number of qubits employed.
In the one qubit case we achieve the same bias as Berlín et al., ǫ = 0.4, while for two qubits the bias reduces to
0.3975. Numerical evidence based on semi-definite programming [23] suggests that the bias continues to decrease
as the number of qubits is increased, but at a rapidly decreasing rate. Our protocol bears some similarity to the
original BB84 CF protocol [22] and its various derivatives [3, 5, 19], but significantly differs in that it is not based on
bit-commitment.
II. A FAMILY OF LOSS-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS
The protocols read as follows:
1. Alice selects N orientations αˆ1 to αˆN , where each of the αˆi is (uniformly) randomly picked from a set of four
predetermined orientations nˆ, −nˆ, mˆ, and -mˆ (which are known to Bob). Alice prepares N qubits polarized
along these orientations, i.e. the first qubit is polarized along αˆ1, the second along αˆ2, etc., and sends these N
qubits to Bob.
2. Bob selects N orientations βˆ1 to βˆN , where each of the βˆi is (uniformly) randomly picked from the set of two
orientations nˆ and mˆ, and then measures the polarization of the first qubit along βˆ1, the polarization of the
second along β2, etc.
3. If all the measurements are successful (i.e. he has detected the N qubits and has obtained N definite outcomes),
he asks Alice to proceed with the protocol, otherwise, he asks her to restart the protocol (i.e. repeat step 1).
4. Alice sends Bob a randomly selected classical bit c.
5. Let r1 to rN denote the outcomes of Bob’s N measurements. The outcome of the coin flip o is given by
o = c⊕ (⊕Ni=1 ri
)
. Bob informs Alice of his choice of orientations, βˆi, and the corresponding outcomes, ri.
6. Alice aborts whenever there is at least one qubit that Bob claims to have successfully measured for which
(1− 2r) βˆ = −αˆ.
The loss tolerance of the protocol comes into play at step 3, where Bob asks Alice to restart the protocol whenever
one or more of his measurements are unsuccessful, in which case the outcomes of the successful measurements are
discarded. That is, Bob must successfully measure N -qubits in a single run of the protocol. Also note that we do not
fix the angle between the axes nˆ and mˆ. Indeed, this angle is a free a parameter. In particular, it turns out that by
manipulating it we can make the protocol ‘fair’ in the sense that Alice’s and Bob’s maximal biases are equal.
3III. ALICE’S MAXIMAL BIAS
It will prove convenient to choose the coordinate system such that nˆ and mˆ lie on the x z plane, spanning an angle
of θ, −θ, respectively, from the z axis (see Fig. 1).
Since Bob is honest he will measure each qubit along one of the two axes nˆ and mˆ with equal probability. Suppose
that Alice wishes to bias the outcome to 0. With no loss of generality we assume that Alice selects c = 0. Then the
probability that she is successful equals
P
(N)
∗0 = max
ρ
1
2N
∑
bˆ1=nˆ, mˆ
. . .
∑
bˆn=nˆ, mˆ
P
( N⊕
i=1
ri = 0 |
{
bˆ1, bˆ2, . . . , bˆN
}
, ρ
)
; (1)
the superscript N serving to denote the number of qubits employed in the protocol. Introducing the operator
ΠN =ˆ
1
2N
∑
bˆ1=nˆ, mˆ
∑
s1=±1
. . .
∑
bˆn=nˆ, mˆ
∑
sN=±1
Θ(s1 · s2 · . . . · sN )
N⊗
i=1
∣∣↑
sibˆi
〉〈↑
si bˆi
∣∣ , (2)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function, we have that
P
(N)
∗0 = max
ρ
Tr (ρΠN ) . (3)
Clearly, the maximum obtains when ρ equals the (normalized) eigenvector (or any one of the eigenvectors) of ΠN
corresponding to the greatest eigenvalue. Making use of the fact that
|↑±nˆ〉 〈↑±nˆ|+ |↑±mˆ〉 〈↑±mˆ| = 1± cos (θ)σz (4)
(and s1 · s2 · . . . · sN = 1 since Alice wishes to bias the outcome to 0), eq. (2) simplifies to
ΠN =
1
2N
∑
s1=±1
. . .
∑
sN=±1
Θ(s1 · s2 · . . . · sN )
N⊗
i=1
(
1i + si cos (θ)σ
(i)
z
)
=
1
2N
∑
s1=±1
. . .
∑
sN=±1
Θ(s1 · s2 · . . . · sN )
(
1+
N∑
i=1
si cos (θ) Σ
(i)
z + 2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
sisj cos
2 (θ)Σ(i)z Σ
(j)
z
+ . . .+ cosN (θ)
N∏
i=1
Σ(i)z
)
=
1
2
(
1+ cosN (θ)
N⊗
i=1
σ(i)z
)
. (5)
Here we use the notation
Σ
(i)
a =ˆ11 ⊗ . . .⊗ 1i−1 ⊗ σ(i)z ⊗ 1i+1 ⊗ . . .⊗ 1N , a = x, y, z (6)
with 1i denoting the identity operator on the Hilbert space of the i th qubit. The eigenvalues of ΠN equal(
1± cosN (θ)) /2. The resulting biases are thus given by
P
(N)
∗0 = P
(N)
∗1 =
1
2
(
1 + cosN (θ)
)
, (7)
since the probability of biasing to 0 and 1 are patently equal.
IV. BOB’S MAXIMAL BIAS
In the following it will prove economical to employ the following notation:
∣∣ψ(0)0
〉
=ˆ
∣∣↑nˆ
〉
,
∣∣ψ(1)0
〉
=ˆ
∣∣↓nˆ
〉
,
∣∣ψ(0)1
〉
=ˆ
∣∣↑mˆ
〉
,∣∣ψ(1)1
〉
=ˆ
∣∣↓mˆ
〉
, so that the basis |↑nˆ〉, |↓nˆ〉 (|↑mˆ〉, |↓mˆ〉) is denoted by 0 (1). In addition, we define
∣∣ψ(r)
b
〉
=ˆ
⊗N
i=1
∣∣ψ(ri)bi
〉
,
4where b=ˆ (b1, b2, . . . , bN ) and r=ˆ (r1, r2, . . . , rN ) are binary N -tuples, i.e. bi, ri ∈ {0, 1}.
The loss-tolerant nature of the protocol allows (a dishonest) Bob to carry out a measurement at step 2 to decide
whether to keep the N the qubits. Only when he has decided to keep them does he proceed to step 4. Then,
depending on the value of the classical bit c (received at step 4), he will carry out another measurement on the N
qubits at step 5. The outcome of this measurement instructs him what N -tuples b and r to tell Alice that he selected
and (supposedly) obtained, respectively. More specifically, at step 2 Bob will carry out a two-outcome POVM with
elements Πp, Πrs = 1 − Πp. If he obtains the outcome associated with Πrs he asks Alice to restart the protocol.
Otherwise, if he obtains the outcome associated with Πp, he keeps the qubits and they proceed to step 4. At step 5
Bob already knows the value of c. Let us assume that he would like to bias the outcome to 0, then to optimize his
chances of being successful he will have to tell Alice announce an N -tuple r such that
⊕
i ri = 0⊕ c = c. He will then
carry out an additional POVM on the N -qubits with 22N−1 outcomes, which instructs him what N -tuples b and r to
announce. We will denote this second POVM by Πr b0 c , where the subscripts 0 and c correspond to the value to which
Bob wants to bias the coin and the value of the classical bit sent by Alice, and the superscripts b and r correspond
to the choice of bases and the associated outcomes that he sends Alice. Hence, a cheating strategy designed to obtain
the outcome 0 consists of a set of three POVMs with elements {Πp, Πrs}, {Πr b0 0 |
⊕
ri = 0} and {Πr b0 1 |
⊕
ri = 1}.
In the following it will facilitate matters to introduce the positive operators M r b0 c =ˆ
√
ΠpΠ
r b
0 c
√
Πp, which we note
satisfy
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i ri=c}
M r b0 c =
√
Πp
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i ri=c}
Πr b0 c
√
Πp = Πp . (8)
Suppose now that Alice prepared at step 1 the state
∣∣ψ(s)a
〉
, and, having been asked to proceed with the protocol,
sends Bob the classical bit c at step 4. Bob gets caught cheating when for one or more of the qubits, bi = ai and
ri = si ⊕ 1. Bob’s minimal probability of being caught cheating therefore equals
1− P (N)0∗ =
1
22N+1
min
{Mr b0 c }
∑
c=0, 1
∑
{a}
∑
{s}
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i
ri=c}
Θ
( N∑
j=1
δbj , aj · δrj , sj⊕1
)〈ψ(s)a
∣∣M r b0 c
∣∣ψ(s)a
〉
〈
ψ
(s)
a
∣∣Πp|ψ(s)a
〉 , (9)
where the summation is carried out over the set of all possible binary N -tuples, {a}, {b}, {s}, and {r |⊕i ri = c}.
The Heaviside step-function, additionally defined such that Θ(0) =ˆ0, serves to guarantee that only terms, which
satisfy bi = ai and ri = si ⊕ 1 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, contribute. Finally, the 22N+1 factor is just the
number of possible choices for the triplet c, a, and s.
Clearly, no value of c is in any way preferable for Bob, nor is any orientation or any particular qubit. This implies
the existence of an optimal symmetric cheating strategy in the sense that all of the POVM elements (pertaining
to both the POVM carried out when c = 0 and the POVM carried out when c = 1) contribute equally. To see
this, we first assume the existence of an optimal (possibly asymmetric) strategy. Let {M˜ r b0 0 } and {M˜ r b0 1 } denote the
corresponding two sets of positive operators. Then, for any binary N -tuple u, another optimal cheating strategy is
obtained by the transformation
M˜ r b0 c →M r b⊕u0 c = Σuz M˜ r b0 c Σuz , (10)
where Σu
a
=ˆΠNi=1 Σ
(i)
a
ui
(a = x, y, z) and a ⊕ b=ˆ (a1 ⊕ b1, . . . , aN ⊕ bN), corresponding to rotations by π about the
z axes of the coordinate systems of the set of qubits {i | ui = 1}. Similarly, for any binary N -tuple u, we obtain yet
another optimal cheating strategy via
M˜ r b0 c →M r⊕ub⊕u0 c⊕(⊕i ui) = Σ
u
xM˜
r b
0 c Σ
u
x , (11)
corresponding to rotations by π about the x axes of the coordinate systems of the set of qubits {i | ui = 1}. (When⊕
i ui = 1 we switch from a POVM corresponding to one value of c to a POVM corresponding to the other value.)
Now a strategy in which Bob chooses at random between different optimal strategies is also optimal. By choosing
uniformly at random between optimal strategies related by the transformations eqs. (10) and (11), Bob obtains an
optimal strategy characterized by the positive operators
M r b0 c =
1
4N
∑
{u}
∑
{w}
ΣuxΣ
w
z M˜
r⊕u b⊕w⊕u
0 c⊕(
⊕
i
ui)
ΣuxΣ
w
z ; (12)
the only subtle point in the above argument concerns those transformations given by eq. (11) that modify the value
c and exchange between elements in {M˜ rb0 0 } and {M˜ r b0 1 }. Nevertheless, this does not pose a problem since in an
5optimal cheating strategy the overall contribution to the cheating probability when c = 0 and c = 1 must be equal,
and, moreover, eqs. (11) and the invariance of Πp under the application of the rotation operators, imply that in an
optimal cheating strategy the sets {M˜ r b0 0 } and {M˜ rb0 1 } can be obtained from one another via the transformation eq.
(11). Finally, we note that this pair of sets, eq. (12), can be characterized by any of the positive operators within the
sets, say M0 00 0 (0=ˆ (0, . . . , 0)). All other positive operators (including those corresponding to c = 1) can be obtained
from it by the transformations eqs. (10) and (11). In appendix A we prove that eqs. (8), (10), (11) and (12) imply
that one can take Πp = 1. This means that Bob stands nothing to gain by performing a measurement on the qubits
prior to receiving the value of the classical bit c.
The problem of optimizing Bob’s bias can be cast as an SDP (see [23] for an introduction). Using the fact that we
can set Πp = 1 (and recalling that the rotation operators switch between all of Alices’ preparations), the right-hand
side of eq. (9) can be reexpressed as Tr
(
M000 0 ΛN (θ)
)
, with
ΛN (θ) =
1
22N+1
∑
c=0, 1
∑
{a}
∑
{s}
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i
ri=c}
Θ
( N∑
j=1
δbj , aj · δrj , sj⊕1
)∣∣ψ(s⊕r)
a⊕b
〉〈
ψ
(s⊕r)
a⊕b
∣∣ . (13)
The SDP then reads
P
(N)
0∗ = maxM0 00 0
(
1− Tr (M000 0 ΛN (θ)
))
(14)
subject to 2N−1Tr
(
M000 0
)
= 1, Tr
(
M000 0
⊗N
i=1 σ
(i)
z
)
= 0, M000 0 ≥ 0 .
The derivation of the first two constraints is given in Appendix A.
Now problems of this type, have associated with them a dual problem. The solution of this dual problem bounds
from above the solution of the of the original problem, [23], which we shall refer to as the ‘primal’ problem. It is given
by
minλi
(
1− 12λ1
)
(15)
subject to ΛN (θ)− λ11+ λ2
⊗N
i=1 σ
(i)
z ≥ 0 ,
where the variables of the dual problem, the λi, are real scalars.
A. The single qubit case
It is straightforward to solve both eqs. (14) and (15) in the single qubit case. The solution is given by
P
(1)
0∗ = P
(1)
1∗ =
1
4
(3 + sin (θ)) , (16)
where the second equality follows from the equality of the probabilities of biasing to 0 and 1, and is obtained for
2M0 00 0 = 1+ σx. Hence, Bob’s strategy consists of measuring the polarization of the qubit along the x axis.
B. The two-qubit case
In the two qubit case Bob measures an eight outcome POVM M
(r1, r1⊕c)b
0 c (recall that we have assumed that Bob
wants to bias the outcome to 0). By introducing a new set of Lagrange multipliers ξ = λ1 − λ2 and χ = λ1 + λ2, the
dual problem can be reexpressed as
minξ, χ
(
1− 14 (ξ + χ)
)
(17)
subject to Λ2 (θ)− ξ (|↑↑〉 〈↑↑|+ |↓↓〉 〈↓↓|)− χ (|↑↓〉 〈↑↓|+ |↓↑〉 〈↓↑|) ≥ 0 .
The solution obtains when
det (Λ2 (θ)− ξ (|↑↑〉 〈↑↑|+ |↓↓〉 〈↓↓|)− χ (|↑↓〉 〈↑↓|+ |↓↑〉 〈↓↑|)) = 0 , (18)
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Figure 2: The dashed curve depicts Bob’s maximal probability of biasing the outcome in the single qubit case, while each of
the four other curves depict eq. (17) as a function of a different root of eq. (20). Note that two of the roots become complex
beyond θ ≃ 0.8056.
i.e. when the lowest eigenvalue of the constraint matrix eq. (17) equals zero. Solving for χ in terms of ξ we get
χ =
(cos (2θ) + 7) ξ2 − 3 (cos (2θ) + 3) ξ
8ξ2 + (cos (2θ)− 13) ξ − 3 (cos (2θ)− 1) . (19)
(There is another solution χ = 1, but it can be shown that in this case the constraint matrix always admits a negative
eigenvalue.) Plugging back into eq. (17), taking the derivative with respect to ξ, and equating to zero, we get a fourth
order equation in ξ
64ξ4+16 (cos (2θ)− 13) ξ3+(cos (4θ)− 56 cos (2θ) + 199) ξ2−6 (cos (4θ)− 8 cos (2θ) + 7) ξ+9 (cos (4θ)− 1) = 0 . (20)
When plugged back into eq. (17) three of the four roots do not give rise to expressions smaller to Bob’s maximal bias
in the single qubit case. See Fig. 2. Hence, none of these three represents a solution of the primal problem since its
solution must bound from above the solution of the dual problem and clearly Bob can always achieve a bias equal to
that of the single qubit case by simply not following the directions of the protocol in the handling of only one of the
qubits. It is straightforward to show that the remaining eigenvalue satisfies the constraints of the dual problem (i.e.
all other three eigenvalues are positive), and therefore gives rise to an upper bound on Bob’s maximal bias.
V. BIASES IN THE FAIR SCENARIO
To make the protocol fair, i.e. P
(N)
F = P
(N)
∗i = P
(N)
j∗ , we have the freedom to manipulate θ. In this way, for a single
qubit we obtain P
(1)
∗i = P
(1)
j∗ = 0.9 (θ ≃ 36.87◦). In the two qubit case, the solution of the dual problem and Alice’s
maximal bias intersect for θ ≃ 26.92◦, ξ ≃ −0.2098, χ ≃ 0.6197, 1 − (ξ + χ) /4 ≃ P (2)∗0 ≃ 0.8975. It remains to prove
that this intersection indeed corresponds to Bob’s maximal bias, or, what is the same thing, to show that for this
value of the angle the solution of the dual problem coincides with that of the primal problem.
To do so we conjecture that the solution of the primal problem, eq. (15) in the case N = 2, is of the form
2M000 0 = |υ (θ)〉 〈υ (θ)| , (21)
where
|υ (θ)〉 = 1√
2
cos (f (θ)) |↑↑〉+ 1
2
|↑↓〉+ 1
2
|↓↑〉+ 1√
2
sin (f (θ)) |↓↓〉 (22)
and f is some real function of θ. It is easy to verify that eq. (21) satisfies the constraints eq. (15). As a functional of
f , the probability of biasing the outcome to 0 (or 1) then reads
P
(2)
0∗ =
1
64
(
12 cos (2f (θ)) cos (θ) + 2 sin (2f (θ)) sin2 (θ) + cos (f (θ))
(
12
√
2 sin (θ) + sin (2θ)
)
+sin (f (θ))
(
12
√
2 sin (θ)− sin (2θ))− cos (2θ) + 37
)
. (23)
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Figure 3: Maximal biases as a function of θ for N ≤ 2 qubits. The dashed (solid) decaying curve depicts Alice’s bias for N = 2
(N = 1) and the dashed (solid) rising curve depicts Bob’s bias for N = 2 (N = 1).
For θ ≃ 26.92◦ P (2)0∗ is maximized for f ≃ 0.1177 equaling 0.8975 as anticipated.
We see that while Alice’s maximal bias decreases with the increase in the number of qubits, Bob’s maximal bias
increases as we go from one to two qubits (see Fig. 2). For a greater number of qubits, numerical based SDP evidence
indicates the bias in the fair scenario continue to decrease with the increase in the number of qubits (Bob’s bias
increases), but at an increasingly slower rate. We were able to carry out numerics for up to six qubits, and obtained
P
(3)
F ≃ 0.8967, P (4)F = 0.8962, P (5)F ≃ 89.60, P (6)F ≃ 0.8958 (in the later case θ ≃ 15.89◦).
VI. CONCLUSION
It is possible to overcome the problem of losses in quantum CF. A loss-tolerant CF protocol has the property that
its bias remains unchanged even if we allow for it to be restarted whenever losses occur. However, this robustness
seems to come at a price. Berlín et al.’s loss-tolerant SCF protocol achieves a relatively high bias of 0.4. In this paper,
by presenting a family of loss-tolerant SCF protocols, we were able to show that Berlín et al.’s result can be improved
upon. Utilizing a single qubit we reproduced their result, while utilizing a pair of qubits we obtained a bias of 0.3975.
SDP based numerical evidence indicates that the bias continues to decrease as the number of qubits is increased, but
at a rapidly decreasing rate.
In future work it should be interesting to determine the theoretical limits on loss-tolerant CF protocols. Specifically,
can Kitaev’s bound be saturated by a loss-tolerant SCF protocol? If not, what is the bound on loss-tolerant SCF
protocols? Furthermore, is it possible to introduce a loss-tolerant WCF protocol? Two main difficulties are apparent.
First, at the end of a WCF protocol the losing party usually verifies the outcome by measuring a quantum system
that has been kept in a quantum memory storage. Hence, in this scenario the losing party can always avoid losing
by claiming to have lost the stored system. Second, the number of rounds of communication required to realize a CF
protocol with a bias of ǫ is of the order of Ω(log log ǫ−1). In particular, to achieve a loss-tolerant WCF protocol with
an arbitrarily small bias will require the protocol to be impervious to losses occurring at any round, implying that a
dishonest party must not be capable of (probabilistically) inferring whether it is going to win or lose at at any round
before the last.
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8Appendix A
Here we prove that Πp can be set equal to the identity (see remark below eq. (8)), and we prove the constraints on
primal problem, eq. (14).
Recall that
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i
ri=c}
M r b0 c = Πp . (A1)
We would like to show that upon summation all Pauli basis vectors composed of or one or more of the σ
(i)
x or σ
(i)
y
vanish. To see this, we note for every element in the sum M r b0 c there is another element M
r b
′
0 c , such that b
′
j = bj ⊕ δij .
Algebraically, this second element is identical to the first except that in its Pauli basis expansion the coefficient of
every basis vector composed of either σ
(i)
x or σ
(i)
y has the opposite sign, so that upon summation they cancel each
other. See eqs. (10) and (11).
It remains to show that the sum of all Pauli basis vectors composed solely of one or more of the σ
(i)
z and identity
operators vanish. We note that for every element in the sum M r b0 c there is another element M
r
′
b
0 c , such that r
′
k =
rk ⊕ δik ⊕ δjk with i 6= j. This second element is identical to the first except that in its Pauli basis expansion the
coefficients of basis vectors composed of either σ
(i)
z or σ
(j)
z (and identity operators), but not both, have opposite signs.
See eqs. (10) and (11). The vanishing of basis vectors composed of both σ
(i)
z and σ
(j)
z (and identity operators), but
not
⊗N
i=1 σ
(i)
z , then follows from repeating this argument for all possible pairs of indices k and l 6= k. Hence, upon
summation all Pauli basis vectors composed of one or more of the σ
(i)
z , except
⊗N
i=1 σ
(i)
z , vanish, and it follows that
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i
ri=c}
M r b0 c = α1+ γ ⊗Ni=1 σ(i)z . (A2)
However, from eq. (11) we have that
∑
{b}
∑
{r|
⊕
i
ri=c⊕1}
M r b0 c⊕1 = α1− γ ⊗Ni=1 σ(i)z . (A3)
Since both eqs. (A2) and (A3) must be equal, the coefficient of ⊗Ni=1σ(i)z must vanish and Πp is seen to be proportional
to the identity. This implies that Bob learns nothing from his first POVM with elements Πp and Πrs, since both
elements are proportional to the identity. So that without loss of generality we can take Πp equal to the identity.
Finally, since the sum is composed of 22N−1 2N × 2N -dimensional matrices, and since in its Pauli basis expansion
each matrix admits the same coefficient for the identity, it follows that 2N−1Tr
(
M r b0 c
)
= 1. Together, these last
remarks imply the constraints in the SDP eq. (14).
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